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COMMENTS

The Emerging Fixed Cramdown Rate
Regime: A Market-Driven Argument for
Effective Fixed Rates in Bankruptcy
Cramdown
MICHAEL E. S. FRANKEL

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code' (the Code) is a delicate statutory
dance that balances an effort to resuscitate the debtor corporation against a
desire to protect the interests of its creditors. In the ideal chapter 11 world, all
concerned parties would unanimously approve reorganization plans. However,
a system that depended upon unanimous approval would allow any individual
creditor to hold a reorganization plan hostage and either block the reorganization or extort a fee for its approval. At a minimum, such a system would
result in increased bargaining costs, and at worst it would create bargaining
failures that would prevent efficient reorganizations. The Code provides a
protection against this sort of behavior by allowing the court, under certain
circumstances, to "cramdown" a reorganization plan on unwilling creditors.2
These cramdown proceedings raise an important question: when courts
cramdown a reorganization plan, what interest rate should they impose on
secured creditors? Courts have largely taken a discretionary approach to this
problem. They have employed several related methodologies to gauge the
correct interest rate for each particular fact pattern before them.
One advantage of this discretionary approach is that it allows courts to
more accurately match cramdown interest rates to the risks associated with
particular debtors. To the extent that secured creditors are "innocents" in the
cramdown process, 3 this accuracy provides the most equitable result because

Michael E. S. Frankel received his J.D. and M.B.A. in 1995 and his B.A. and M.A. in

1990 from the University of Chicago.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 USC §§ 101 et seq (1988 & Supp 1993).
2. 11 USC S 1129(b).
3. This view of secured creditors is suggested by the coerced loan theory of
cramdown, which is discussed in Section I. Under this theory, a secured claimant in
cramdown should be viewed as though she were a third party coerced to provide a loan
to the reorganized firm.
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it compensates secured creditors for the risks they incur by continuing to hold
a claim against the reorganized firm. However, this accuracy comes at a price.
The discretionary approach requires a case-by-case fact inquiry which can be
costly and time-consuming. Furthermore, under this approach, when ex ante
creditors and debtors negotiate a loan, they face significant uncertainty about
the potential costs of bankruptcy and reorganization.
This Comment examines the advantages and disadvantages of various
discretionary approaches courts have adopted. It will argue that courts should
determine cramdown rates with an alternative rules-based approach. After
courts satisfy the basic requirements of the statutory language,4 they can
calculate cramdown rates by focusing on ex ante effects rather than on a
search for case-by-case accuracy. This approach implies that the cramdown
rate should be fixed or linked to a particular predictable standard (e.g., the
contract, prime, or treasury rate). While the proposed approach may be less
accurate at a case-by-case level, this Comment will argue that a predictable
cramdown interest rate allows parties to adjust their contracts ex ante to
reflect the risks and costs of a cramdown. Thus, a perfectly or highly predictable cramdown interest rate may yield results similarly equitable to those
achieved under a discretionary approach. Further, this rule-based approach is
less costly and time-consuming than a case-by-case inquiry. This Comment
concludes by examining the likely consequences, positive and negative, of a
shift by bankruptcy courts to such a rule-based approach and the factors that
should drive the choice of the particular fixed rate.
I. The Current Approach to Cramdown Interest Rates
According to chapter 11 of the Code, a reorganization plan must pass the
"best interests of creditors" test. That is, each member of an impaired class'
who holds a claim must approve the plan,6 or the plan must provide each
such claim holder with not less than the amount she would receive in a
chapter 7 liquidation.7 Under the cramdown provision, the court may confirm
a reorganization plan even when an impaired class objects, as long as the plan
does not discriminate unfairly and is "fair and equitable" with respect to the
class that has rejected the plan.' "Fair and equitable" is a term of art upon
which the Code expands. The common law basis for the term is found in

4. Read strictly, the cramdown provision only requires that the discounted payment
stream received equal the net present value of the claim, without taking into account any
.risk" variables. Under this reading, the present value requirement is simply a baseline that
mandates that the creditor receive no less than an unadjusted base market rate of interest.
5. "A class of claims or interests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to
each claim or interest of such class, the plan leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and
contractual rights" under such a claim. 11 USC S 1124. See also George M. Treister, et
al, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law, 430 (ALI, 3d ed 1993).

6. 11 USC S 1129(a)(7)(A)(i).
7. Id (a)(7)(A)(ii).
8. Id (b)(1).
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Northern Pacific R. Co. v Boyd.9 In Boyd, the Court held that it would not

sanction any plan in which subordinate rights are secured at the expense of
the prior rights of other security holders without the consent of the parties af-

fected.' o To do so, the Court held, would be unfair and inequitable." Thus,
the absolute priority of claims in bankruptcy will be enforced with regard to
parties that 'have not consented to a plan of reorganization. 2 Since Boyd, the
phrase "fair and equitable" has indicated that a reorganization plan satisfies
the absolute priority rule."3

In addition to the Boyd standard, the Code imposes additional requirements. To qualify as "fair and equitable" with respect to secured creditors, a
4
plan must provide that holders of secured claims retain their liens and receive deferred cash payments that total the amount of their claims (face
value)'" and at least the value of their interest in the estate's property (present

value).' 6 Therefore, when courts determine the interest rate to impose under
cramdown, § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and particularly the language that refers to "deferred cash payments . . . [in the amount of] of such claim," drives their inquiry.' 7 When courts apply this section of the Code, they focus primarily on
the merits of different methods to calculate the present value of the secured
claim.' While a variety of such methods have emerged, all employ a discretionary approach that seeks to obtain the correct interest rate based on the
particular fact patterns before them. 9

9. 228 US 482 (1913).

10. Id at 502.
11. Id.
12. Otis & Co. v SEC, 323 US 624, 633, 647 (1945) (citing Boyd, 228 US 482).
13. Case v Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 US 106, 116 (1939).

14. 11 USC S1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I).
15. Id (b)(2)(A)(i)(ll). It is important to note that, barring negative interest rates, it will
be rare for the face value requirement to be a limiting factor since the face value of a
note will not include the interest payments that would be required under a present value
calculation.
16. Id.
17. Additionally, the Code requires that the secured creditors receive the "indubitable
equivalent" of their claims. Id (b)(2)(A)(iii). This concept is rooted in the opinion of Judge
Learned Hand in In re Murel, 75 F2d 941 (2d Cir 1935), and was designed to broaden
the range of solutions available to debtors and creditors in bankruptcy. In re Briggs, 780
F2d 1339, 1346 (8th Cir 1985). The court in Murel specifically stated that "a creditor
who fears the safety of his principal will scarcely be content with [interest payments
alone]; he wishes to get his money or at least the property. We see no reason to suppose
that the statute was intended to deprive him of that . . . unless by a substitute of the
most indubitable equivalence." In re Murel, 75 F2d at 942. The key word in this language is "substitute." In the Matter of Sandy Ridge Development Corp., 881 F2d 1346,
1350 (5th Cir 1989). However, the Court has noted that the right to receive the present
value of a secured claim under S 1129 derives from § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(ll) and not from
the "indubitable equivalence" language in 5 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). United Savings Assn. of
Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 US 365, 377 (1988).
18. See text accompanying notes 26-44.
19. Id.
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The discretionary approach is supported by the coerced loan analogy
adopted by many courts.2 ° Under this approach, when courts choose a
cramdown rate, they examine the merits of variables, which include level of
risk and bankruptcy cost, as well as baselines that include the prime rate and
the original contract rate. 2' As a result, courts have used widely varying levels
of complexity and quantitative sophistication in their interest rate models.
Courts have taken three primary approaches to choosing a cramdown
interest rate. Under the first approach, courts attempt to price the costs a
creditor would incur to replace the funds tied up in the coerced loan.22 Under
the second approach, courts attempt to price the coerced loan made to the
debtor.23 Recently, courts have begun to move away from these two discre24
tionary approaches in favor of a formula method.
All three approaches have the advantage of accuracy in matching
cramdown interest rates to the risks associated with particular debtors.
However, it is important to note that the primary assumptions in all three
approaches are that the goal of the court is to achieve the greatest possible
case-by-case accuracy and that the court can achieve such accuracy only when
it examines the particular facts and equities of each case.
A.

THE COST OF FUNDS APPROACH

Under the cost of funds approach, courts seek to compensate the secured
creditor for the costs of raising the funds that the secured creditor would
otherwise receive in liquidation. 2' This approach is based on the presumption
that the secured creditor will need to replace the funds that she expected to
receive immediately rather than simply waiting for the debt to be paid, perhaps

20. Under the coerced loan analogy the secured creditor treats the secured portion of
the loan, subject to cramdown, like a coerced or new loan. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy
$ 1129.03 at 97-101 (Matthew Bender, 15th ed 1993). The argument is made that deferring payment of an obligation under the cramdown provision is the equivalent of
coercing a loan and that the rate of return on such a loan "must correspond to the rate
which would be charged or obtained by the creditor making a loan to a third party with
similar terms, duration, collateral, and risk." Id at 99. The analogy is based on the pres-

ent value language in the statute. Id at 101. This approach has directed courts toward a
discretionary approach as they seek to construct and define the fictional coerced third
party loan, and it has been adopted by most courts in some form. In re Computer
Optics, Inc., 126 Bankr 664, 671 (Bankr D NH 1991). It is important to note that this
theory does not take into account the possibility that the creditor has already been compensated for the costs of making the coerced loan through ex ante pricing of the loan,
thus distinguishing her from a true third party being coerced to make a loan.
21. 5 Collier on Bankruptcy 1129.03 at 97-101 (cited in note 20).
22. See text accompanying notes 26-27.
23. See text accompanying notes 31-44.
24. See text accompanying notes 45-72.
25. See, for example, In re Fowler, 903 F2d 694, 697-98 (9th Cir 1990); United States
v Doud, 869 F2d 1144, 1146 (8th Cir 1989); In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 Bankr 440,

445-46 (Bankr N D Ga 1991); In re Jordan, 130 Bankr 185, 192 (Bankr D NJ 1991).
See also 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, $1 1325.06[4][b][iii][B] at 1325-45 (cited in note 20).
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over time, after the debtor emerges from bankruptcy. As explained in Collieron
Bankruptcy, "[t]he appropriate discount rate is one which approximates the
creditor's cost of funds in its business borrowings. If the holder of an allowed
secured claim receives interest which compensates it in full for any additional
interest costs incurred due to the deferral of payment, it is not harmed by that
deferral." 26
There are several internal problems with this approach. First, a standard
based on the particular creditor's cost of borrowing involves a case-by-case fact
inquiry. Second, it is doubtful that the secured creditor has an unlimited supply
of credit.27 Third, by focusing on the cost of replacing funds, this approach may
ignore the risks associated with the cramdown itself. There is likely some
correlation between the interest rate a secured creditor can receive in the market
and the degree of its involvement with the debtor. The larger a position the secured creditor has with the debtor, the higher the rate the debtor will be charged
under this approach.
Suppose there are two secured creditors, A and B. They are identical in all
respects except that A has 100 percent of her assets invested in a secured loan to
the debtor while B has only 50 percent of her assets invested in a secured loan
to the debtor, the other 50 percent invested in liquid assets. A will certainly have
a higher cost of capital than B and will pass this cost on to the debtor in the
form of a higher cramdown rate. But the higher rate that A receives is unjustified. Both creditors hold equally risky security interests, yet by virtue of its
percentage holdings, A receives a higher rate. Under such a system, debtors have
an inefficiently low incentive to diversify their security interests because they can
receive a higher cramdown rate with a less diversified portfolio.
Some courts have avoided these problems by abstracting the particular
characteristics of the creditor.2" Instead, they choose a particular standard
market measure like the Treasury bill rate, or the prime rate, thus producing a
simple fixed rate rule.29 However, it is unlikely that the cost of additional funds
for most creditors is accurately represented by these market rates since there is
presumably a wide variance of creditworthiness among the total pool of potential
creditors.
Even if the internal problems with this approach are resolved, there is a more
fundamental issue. The language of the Code is directed at the value of the
secured creditors claim, not at their cost of capital. While one could make an
argument that in a liquid capital market, the cost of capital would be an approximate surrogate for the discount rate applicable to a deferred payment stream, it
is an indirect and imperfect surrogate. A variety of other variables can differentiate the value of the secured creditors claim from the cost of obtaining additional
capital.3" Thus the cost of capital approach internalizes issues relating to the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

S Collier on Bankruptcy J 1325.06[4][b][iii][B] at 1346-47 (cited in note 20).
United Carolina Bank v Hall, 993 F2d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir 1993).
In re Hudock, 124 Bankr 532, 533 (Bankr N D Ill1991).
Id. See also In re Jordan, 130 Bankr 185, 191 (Bankr D NJ 1991).
The value of the secured creditors' claim can be affected by such variables as the
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credit condition of the secured creditor, which are not relevant to the value of
her claim against the debtor.
B. THE NEW LOAN APPROACH
Other courts have adopted a new loan approach, achieving similar results.
The new loan approach is grounded in the coerced loan theory; it attempts to
give the secured creditor an interest rate equal to that which the creditor would
have otherwise received in the market. The Fourth Circuit has accepted this
31
and then explicitly in United
approach, first tacitly in In re Bryson Properties
3
Carolina Bank v Hall." In United Carolina, the court held that "the business
opportunity that the secured creditor might otherwise have been able to pursue
best determines the present value of the allowed secured claim" that is deferred
under the cramdown provision.33 The proper rate under this approach is derived from the particular lending market in which the secured creditor operates.34 The Fourth Circuit also agreed with the ruling of the district court
below, capping the cramdown rate at the original contract rate, to eliminate any
windfall benefit to the secured creditor.3" Thus, the secured creditor bears the
risk of a drop in the market rate but does not receive any benefit from an
increase in the market rate above the contract rate.
In adopting the same approach, the Tenth Circuit opined in In re Hardzog3'
that the new loan approach is superior to both the market-rate or formula
approach and the cost of funds approach.37 The new loan approach does not
require a complex fact inquiry; rather it piggybacks upon the expertise and
efforts of professional lenders.3" The court held that bankruptcy courts should
use "the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region."3
It found a basis for this approach in the new/coerced loan theory and in the
belief that such an approach would yield a fair result for both debtor and
creditor "with neither receiving an advantage over the other."4 The Tenth Circuit does leave open a potential exception to this rule for an undefined set of

quality of the assets that secure it and the likelihood of successful reorganization.
31. 961 F2d 496, 500 (4th Cir 1992).
32. United Carolina, 993 F2d at 1131.
33. Id.
34. In United Carolina, the court looked to the new mobile home (the collateral in
which the security interest was held) financing market. Id at 1126. However, the court
noted that the rate given to the secured creditor should be the net rate that it would have
received, rather than the gross rate (including related costs and fees) that the debtor might
pay. Id. In particular, if the secured creditor purchases the finance contracts from a third
party at a discounted rate, it is this discounted rate, rather than the rate paid by the
debtor, which should be employed. Id.
35. Id (citing In re Mellema, 124 Bankr 103, 107-08 (Bankr D Colo 1991)).
36. See text accompanying notes 44-56.
37. See text accompanying notes 27-28.
38. In re Hardzog, 901 F2d 858, 860 (10th Cir 1990).

39. Id.
40. Id.
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"special circumstances." 4 '
While the Tenth Circuit does not cite to the case directly, it appears to have
drawn the language of its holding largely from a decade-old decision of the Sixth
Circuit. " In Memphis Bank v Whitman, the Sixth Circuit held that "in the
absence of special circumstances bankruptcy courts should use the current
market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region."43 It subsequently
reiterated this rule in US v Arnold. There it held that in a cramdown, where the
secured creditor is forced to write down a portion of its note, the creditor is en44
titled to receive the current market rate for similar loans on the "new loan."
While the Third Circuit adopted a similar approach, it hedged when it held
that the appropriate rate of interest is the rate "currently being charged by the
creditor in the regular course of its business for loans similar in character,
amount and duration" but noted that it is appropriate for a bankruptcy court to
use the contract rate as the default rate in the absence of any evidence to the
45

contrary.
While the argument can be made that the current market rate for similar
loans is a surrogate for the appropriate discount rate, the new loan approach
introduces characteristics of the particular sub-market for loans, and the particular industry, that are not relevant to the value of the secured creditors interest
in collateral.
C. THE FORMULA APPROACH

1. Judicial use of the formula approach.
In the more recent formula approach, courts use a risk-free interest rate base
and then add a risk premium. This approach uses variables that, at least theoretically, equal the present value of a payment stream that can match the value of
the secured creditors' claim. The base rate is usually a common market rate (i.e.,
prime rate or treasury rate);46 the court assigns the risk premium.47 A pattern
has developed whereby courts peg the risk premium within a small range.4"
Since the court looks to the prevailing market in the region for the same type
of loan to determine the risk premium, the Eighth Circuit decision in US v Doud
suggests that this approach can be viewed as a quantification for the cost of
funds approach.49 However, conceptually this approach is entirely different.
While the Eighth Circuit has made reference to examining the "prevailing market
rate for a loan of a term equal to the payout period," the final test it developed

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Memphis Bank v Whitman, 692 F2d 427 (6th Cir 1982).
Id at 431.
US v Arnold, 878 F2d 925, 929-30 (6th Cir 1989).
GMAC v Jones, 999 F2d 63, 71 (3d Cir 1993).

46. See Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in Chapter 11 Cram

Down, 14 Cardozo L Rev 1496, 1516 (1993).
47. Id at 1521.
48. Id at 1517.

49. Doud, 869 F2d at 1146.
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is unlike the approaches discussed above."s Rather, the Eighth Circuit is more
properly grouped with those courts that have chosen the formula approach.
In large part, the decision in Doud is based on the Eighth Circuit's prior
decision in Monnier.s1 In Monnier, the Eighth Circuit held that since the contract was relatively recent, the contract rate did presumably reflect the prevailing
cost of money as well as the inherent risks of the contract.5 2 While the decision
uses the language of the cost of funds, it has the underlying structure of the
formula approach. The court found that the contract rate is the appropriate base
rate and that there were no additional risks to merit a risk premium. 3 An
underlying assumption in the court's analysis is that the risks that are relevant to
the risk premium do not include the risks inherent in bankruptcy itself. Specifically, the court referred to "the prospects for appreciation or depreciation of the
value of the security, and the risks inherent in a long-term agricultural loan" as
those relevant risks which were reflected in the very recent contract rate. s4
In Camino Real, the Ninth Circuit explicitly endorsed a case-by-case approach similar to the cost of funds approach taken by the Fourth, Sixth, and
Tenth Circuits. 5 5 However, in doing so, the court upheld what appears to be a
formula approach (rather than a case-by-case approach) by one of the lower
courts. 6 In a subsequent case, the Ninth Circuit removed any ambiguity by
explicitly endorsing the formula approach. s7 The court held that the cramdown
rate should be derived from a base rate, either the prime rate or the rate on
treasury obligations, and an additional factor based on the risk of default and
the nature of the security (the risk factor)., 8
The formula approach requires the courts to undertake a rather detailed
factual inquiry to choose the risk premium. The result is a numerical "mini-trial"
on the risk premium issue. In addition to the costs of conducting such an inquiry, there may be a tendency by the court to "split the baby" between rates
proposed by the debtor and creditor. In In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., the court
appears to split the difference between the debtor's 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent
proposal and the 4 percent to 5 percent proposal of the creditor, arriving at a 3
percent risk premium. 9
Courts present a variety of potential baselines and variables to assess the risk
premium, but there is no uniformly accepted formula. This approach does
attempt to employ variables that are directly relevant to the value of the secured

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id (citing In re Monnier Bros., 755 F2d 1336, 1339 (8th Cir 1985)).
In re Monnier Bros., 755 F2d at 1336.
Id at 1339.
Id.
Id.
In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors,Inc., 818 F2d 1503, 1508

(9th Cir 1987).
56. Id.
57. In re John Fowler, 903 F2d 694, 698 (9th Cir 1990).
58. Id. For an extensive list of cases using the formula approach, see Friedman, 14
Cardozo L Rev at 1516-17 nn 84-85 (cited in note 46).
59. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 Bankr at 447.
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creditor's claim in the form of a deferred payment stream. However, the formula
approaches require significant fact inquiries, and it is not clear that they will
provide particularly high accuracy.
Courts have responded to these inherent limitations by limiting the extent of
the necessary factual inquiry, tightening the scope of the inquiry, or creating a
default rule. For example, most courts have given little weight to the particular
characteristics of the debtor or creditor." Specifically, courts have refused to
consider the creditor's lending policies,6' cost of funds,62 tax pfoblems, 3 or
age.64
The potential for a court to limit the scope of the inquiry is demonstrated by
the decision in Monnier. There, the court strictly limited the inquiry to the
question of whether the market rate for similar loans had changed since the
contract date (it had not), whether there had been changes in the value of the
security, and whether there were risks unique to a long-term agricultural loan.6'
The court assumed these last two were reflected in the contract rate. 66 Since the
risk premium is based on a hypothetical transaction between generalized creditors and debtors,6 7 a court can use a formula approach and still reach a market
or contract rate result. This is particularly true since most courts have begun to
adopt a single fixed risk premium. In a recent and relatively exhaustive study of
bankruptcy decisions, one commentator noted that "[n]ot one of the reported
decisions, discussing what 'risk factor' should be added to a base rate, has even
analyzed the probability and magnitude of actual risk. Decisions may generally
discuss the condition of the debtor or the collateral.. . but an objective basis for
quantifying the risk factor is rarely developed.""
The use of a default risk premium is an increasingly popular method of
eliminating the need for a complex fact inquiry. The court in Doud recognized
and approved a movement by lower courts in multiple jurisdictions to adopt a
default risk premium of 2 percent.69 The Doud court deferred to the bankruptcy
court's conclusion that a 2 percent risk premium "would adequately compensate
a conventional lender for the overall risk associated with a chapter 12 reorganization."" The rule reiterated by the Doud court has in turn been followed
60. Friedman, 14 Cardozo L Rev at 1518 (cited in note 46).
61. See, for example, In re Manion, 127 Bankr 887, 890-91 (Bankr N D Fla 1991).
62. See, for example, US v Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir 1986).
63. See, for example, In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 Bankr 367, 372 (Bankr S D Cal 1982).
64. See, for example, In re Mulberry Agric Enters, 113 Bankr 30 (Bankr D Kan
1990). See also Friedman, 14 Cardozo L Rev at 1518 (cited in note 46).
65. In re Monnier Bros., 755 F2d at 1339.
66. Id.
67. Friedman, 14 Cardozo L Rev at 1519 (cited in note 46).
68. Id at 1521.
69. Doud, 869 F2d at 1145. For examples of this approach, see In re Wichmann, 77
Bankr 718, 721-22 (Bankr D Neb 1987) (yield on treasury bond plus a 2 percent upward
adjustment to account for the risk was adopted as prevailing market discount rate with
recognition that special circumstances may exist in some cases for departure); In re
Bergbower, 81 Bankr 15, 16 (Bankr S D Ill 1987).
70. Doud, 869 F2d at 1145 (citing In re Doud, 74 Bankr 865 (Bankr S D Iowa
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by other courts.7" However, many courts continue to use a discretionary risk
premium in their application of the formula approach.72
2. An alternative version of the formula approach.
The courts could adopt the formula approach and simplify it further by
replacing the discretionary risk premium with a discrete set of variables that are
easy to calculate. This simplification would not undermine the central theme of
present value, which underlies the congressional intent behind the cramdown
provision. The relevant House Report states that the Code "contemplates a present value analysis that will discount value to be received in the future."73 The
Congressional Record provides little additional clarity on the question of how to
price the deferred payment stream under cramdown. It has been interpreted as
simply noting that the court can impose cramdown if members of the dissenting
class receive "property of a value equal to the allowed amount of their secured
claims."74 A plain language interpretation of the statute and Congressional
Record suggests a simple payment stream discounted to reflect the time value of
money in the current economy, without any additional fact-based considerations.7'
Presumably, the economic premise of this approach is that a secured creditor
in cramdown faces no true default risk. Since the secured creditor retains a lien
on the secured collateral, a future default by the debtor would simply result in
an exercise of the lien, and thus the secured creditor would realize the liquidation
value of the collateral.76 To be just as well off as under an original chapter 7
liquidation, the secured creditor must simply be compensated for the change in
value between her share of an immediate liquidation and an uncertain future
liquidation. To this end, the secured creditor would have to be compensated for
depreciation in the collateral and the risk that the collateral would be damaged,
wasted, or destroyed while in the hands of the debtor. The secured creditor
might also seek advance compensation for the potential costs involved in exercising the lien in any subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. All of these variables are
quantifiable. The depreciation costs of the collateral should be easy to ascertain.
The risk of damage will be equal to the cost of insurance (thus the debtor would
effectively have the choice of insuring the collateral or paying the cost of insurance to the secured creditor). Finally, the costs of future bankruptcy proceedings
could either be assessed as an additional secured claim at the point of filing or

1987)).
71. In re Computer Optics, Inc., 126 Bankr 664, 672 (Bankr D NH 1991).
72. See Friedman, 14 Cardozo L Rev at 1516-17 nn 84-85 (cited in note 46).
73. Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, 414-15
(1977).
74. Asa S. Herzog and Lawrence P. King, eds, Collier Pamphlet Edition Bankruptcy
Code 793 (Matthew Bender, 1993). See also HR Rep No 95-595 at 413-18 (cited in note
73).
75. See Waltraud S. Scott, Deferred Cash Payments to Secured Creditors in Cram
Down of Chapter 11 Plans: A Matter of Interest, 63 Wash L Rev 1041, 1043-44 (1988).
76. 11 USC S 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I).
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given to the secured creditor as a payment stream equalling the future costs discounted by the likelihood of a future filing. Presumably, the court could make an
assessment or simply use a general probability. The work done by noted economists suggests that approximately 52 percent of restructuring attempts end in
bankruptcy.' The opportunity costs of not receiving the value immediately
under liquidation, but rather through a stream of payments, should be reflected
in the base risk free market rate of interest.78 It is more difficult to calculate the
harm to the creditor if a debtor wastes or otherwise consumes an asset. However, if this is a standard operation under the debtor's business, there should be
some historical data available to calculate the cost of such waste. 9
Under this proposed alternative formula approach, the court can calculate a
cramdown rate relatively easily. Perhaps more importantly creditors and debtors
can predict the cramdown rate with relative certainty."
II. Weaknesses in the Current Approaches
The foundation of the methodologies described above is a discretionary
approach emphasizing case-by-case accuracy and equity. While the use of default
rules and simplified formulas limit the frequency or scope of factual inquiry,
judges still have discretion to make such an inquiry.
The primary value of the discretionary approach is the prospect of case-bycase accuracy in assigning cramdown interest rates. This accuracy does come at
the cost of a more detailed factual inquiry. However, courts are well versed in
such inquiries since, by their very nature, they are faced with a series of individual cases and equities. Rather than emphasizing the net result of the pool of
bankruptcy decisions upon the pool of cases, the discretionary approach focuses
courts' attention on the equities and facts'before them. Even the default rule approach offered by the court in Doud leaves open the possibility of "special
circumstances" in which such discretion will reappear.8 '
One might argue that under the discretionary approach, courts interpose
themselves more completely into the relationship between the parties by effectively seeking to create a new loan contract based on equitable terms inferred from
the facts of the case. However, a discretionary approach is not mandated by the

77. Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John, and Larry H. P. Lang, Troubled Debt Restructurings:
An Empirical Study of Private Reorganization of Firns in Default, 27 J Fin Econ 315,
328 (1990).
78. While courts have tended to utilize prime or treasury rates for this base rate, the
goal of compensating for lost opportunity costs suggests that a standard commercial rate
might be more appropriate. The argument for this approach is similar to that presented
in the cost of funds approach. See text accompanying notes 30-33.
79. If the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization of the debtor's business, the creditor may be able to obtain relief from the automatic stay. 11 USC
S 362(d)(2)(B).
80. See text accompanying notes 84-91.
81. Doud, 869 F2d at 1145. This emphasis on the specific facts of the case appears
to have been bolstered by the adoption of the coerced loan approach.
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Code. In fact, the Code emphasizes minimal court involvement. 2 Thus, a less
active and case-specific approach may still fulfill the statutory requirements.
Further, if a less active approach does not significantly erode the accuracy and
equity of the results, the primary goals of the discretionary approach would still
be achieved.
There are several factors that limit the accuracy of a discretionary approach
and create a high variance in the cramdown rates courts impose. First, there is a
significant information problem. I assume here that the judge gets most of her
data from the parties. The judge will likely seek a point between the two parties,
creating an incentive for the parties to push further and further from the "correct" rate. Under a standard arbitration model, we will have a "split the baby"
problem where each side has an incentive to radicalize their claims and the judge
is left with widely disparate arguments. 3 Further, certain judges may also have
internal biases in their decisionmaking ("pro-creditor" or "pro-debtor" judges).
Unless the parties' efforts to influence the judge are balanced and the judge is
unbiased, the judge may often arrive at an inaccurate rate. Second, there are also
significant questions about the accuracy of court assessments, beyond information problems. While courts make substantial efforts to delve into issues of
economics and corporate finance, 84 they often make errors in their effort to
understand or explain loan markets and interest rates.8"
Third, since the judge is primarily concerned with the particular case at
hand, rather than in influencing the decisions of the wider population of current
non-bankruptcy creditors, there is no check on a high level of variance between
different cramdown rate decisions and the decisions of different judges. The
decisions are driven by case-specific considerations such as pre-bankruptcy terms
and agreements, goals of successful reorganization, and general equity concerns.
As a result, when judges exercise discretion their decisions will be driven by these
case-specific concerns, rather than the impact those decisions will have on future
creditor behavior.
Thus, a discretionary approach does not guarantee case-by-case accuracy,
and it is also likely to yield a wide variance in the cramdown rates courts
impose.

82. See, for example, Scott, 63 Wash L Rev at 1043 (cited in note 75).
83. Offer arbitration solves this problem by forcing each side to submit a final offer,
knowing that the arbitrator will choose the most reasonable one. This creates an "inward"
pressure on offers; the offers are pushed together rather than apart. However, this
methodology is probably not practical in a bankruptcy context for many reasons including
the fact that it is a multi-polar rather than bipolar conflict.
84. See, for example, In re Arnold, 80 Bankr 806, 809 (Bankr M D La 1987) (explaining that aspects of risk are not limited to default but include liquidity risk and inflationary expectations).
85. Scott, 63 Wash L Rev at 1052 (cited in note 75). See, for example, In re Bay
Area Servs., 26 Bankr 811, 814 (Bankr M D Fla 1982) (court ordered interest rate
calculated by adding 10 percent for inflation to the prime rate, thus double-counting
expected inflation which is already included in the prime rate).
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III. A Fixed Rate Approach to Cramdown Interest Rates
A. ARGUMENT FOR A FIXED RATE APPROACH

A strong argument can be made for a fixed rate rule as an alternative to the
discretionary approaches. Under such a rule, the cramdown rate would be fixed
and completely predictable, in the form of either a fixed number or a number
based on clear ex ante determinable variables (e.g., the contract rate). The
argument is that such a fixed rate rule does not provide a less accurate or less
equitable result than the discretionary approach. Moreover, a fixed rate rule
enhances the ex ante ability of creditors and debtors to contract efficiently by
providing a predictable result in the event of cramdown.
Currently, after ensuring accuracy and equity a court is left to decide where
to place the costs of risk associated with the coerced loan. Courts that grant high
risk premiums are placing that cost upon the debtor, while courts that are
unwilling to grant risk premiums are attaching that cost to the creditor. By
providing a risk premium but setting it unrealistically low, most courts appear to
split the difference.
If we presume that creditors factor the risks and costs of bankruptcy ex ante
into the rates they charge, the .only risk which is uncertain is the cramdown rate
itself. A fixed rate rule provides creditors with perfect predictability. In a classic
statement about the role of legal formalities, Lon Fuller, a noted legal theorist,86
has pointed to their cautionary and channelling functions.87 Legal formalities
"perform a cautionary or deterrent function by acting as a check against inconsiderate action. " " They also perform a channelling function by marking enforceability and therefore inducing deliberation. 9 Thus, a formal rule will
induce creditors to factor the fixed rate ex ante into the rates they charge.90
In an efficient market, creditors should demand to be compensated ex ante
the
risks and costs inherent in a debt contract.9' Therefore, debt contracts
for
will be priced and structured to reflect the risks and costs of bankruptcy, includ92
ing the potential for cramdown proceedings and the rates which would apply.
86. Fuller has been referred to as one of the preeminent legal theorists of his time.
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on Judge Weinstein's Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort
Litigation, 88 Nw U L Rev 569, 574 (1994).
87. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum L Rev 799, 800 (1941).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. A somewhat similar argument has been made in support of a formal rule of contract formulation in the context of the mirror image rule and S 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. See Douglas G. Baird and Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the
Battle of the Forms: A Reassessment of 5 2-207, 68 Va L Rev 1217, 1231 (1982)
(arguing that "because contracting parties have a strong incentive to order their transactions to conform with specific rules, the parties themselves can mitigate the apparent
imprecision of these rules").
91. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U Chi L Rev 89, 112 (1985).
92. Thus, the costs of bankruptcy and default are simply redistributed to other debtors
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Under a high cramdown rate, creditors may require lower interest rates and less
collateral. In turn, these lower requirements are likely to allow more debtors to
seek credit. Similarly, a low cramdown rate is likely to raise interest rates and
collateral requirements ex ante and thus reduce the number of loans made. Thus
we presume that creditors will adjust interest rates, collateral requirements, and
other variables ex ante to account for the risks and costs of cramdown.
This suggests that creditors will be concerned less with whether a cramdown
rate is high or low, since the rate will be priced ex ante in the original debt
contract, and more with the certainty and predictability of the cramdown rate.
This certainty and predictably enables creditors to accurately price the loan ex
ante and thus ensure the certainty of the compensation they will receive in the
event of cramdown.93 Thus, a simple fixed rate rule provides superior results
because it will produce more predictable outcomes upon which to price debt
contracts.
Further, to the extent that we presume creditors and debtors efficiently price
the costs of bankruptcy and cramdown ex ante, a fixed rate rule might even
provide a similar level of accuracy in measuring the "correct" case-by-case
cramdown rate.94 If a creditor factors the possibility of receiving a fixed and
known cramdown rate in bankruptcy into the price of credit charged to a debtor,
she should be perfectly compensated in cramdown for the risk she contracted to
take. Thus, a fixed rate rule would provide a perfectly equitable and "correct"
case-by-case result to the extent that a creditor can accurately price the risks and
costs of bankruptcy ex ante.
A fixed rate rule will therefore provide creditors ex post with exactly the
entitlements they bargained for pre-bankruptcy. Instead of depending upon the
discretion of the judge in determining the rate which fairly provides the creditor
with its entitlements, the rate is fixed and creditors are left to bargain with the
debtor ex ante for a contract that reflects the fixed rate.

or debtors of a particular class (e.g., a similar risk group to the defaulting/bankrupt debtor) in the form of higher rates for credit and perhaps to other segments of the economy
in the form of higher prices for goods. See David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth,
Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform 37 (Brookings, 1971). Except in periods when
bankruptcies are increasing so rapidly that lenders are unable to raise credit charges fast
enough to earn a normal profit, the creditors themselves are unlikely to bear these costs.
Id.
93. Luther Zeigler, The Fraud Exception to Discharge in Bankruptcy: A Reappraisal,
38 Stan L Rev 891, 906 n 63 (1986).
94. Given the large volume of data available on historical bankruptcy proceedings,
particularly for large firms, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that a creditor has
some ability to price ex ante the risks and costs of bankruptcy. This proposition finds
indirect empirical support from the work of Jerold Warner on the pricing of possible
departures from the absolute priority rule in bankruptcy. Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy,
Absolute Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J Fin Econ 239 (1977).
Warner found that the capital market prices debt claims so as to properly reflect "the
possibility of deviations from the absolute priority rule." Id at 272. His findings support
the notion that the capital markets and likely individual creditors make consistent efforts
to price the risks and costs of bankruptcy.
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A fixed rate rule finds support in the legislative history of the Code. In 1952,
chapter 11 was actually amended to eliminate the phrase "fair and equitable,""5
and it was replaced by a more limited quantitative test of "whether more was
given creditors under the plan than they would receive in liquidation. "9G While
"fair and equitable" and its common law construction were re-introduced
through the consolidation of chapter 11 with chapter 10 to form the current
chapter 11, there is still a strong emphasis on respecting privately negotiated
terms. In particular, chapter 11 leaves "the fairness of the plan to the bargain of
the parties, with the minimum requirement that creditors receive the liquidation
value of the assets."98 The aim of the Code was thus to create an absolute
baseline (the liquidation value of the collateral) from which a largely private
bargaining process was to operate. Further, there is no emphasis on the equitable
demands of the creditors but only on their baseline right to the liquidation value
of their secured collateral. 99
This suggests an alternative tack for courts to take, focusing on the wider
goals of the statute, rather than the individual equities of the case before them.
Under this view, after the court satisfies the minimum requirement of liquidation
value, it can concern itself with the general goals of the bankruptcy statute rather
than the particular equity concerns of the individual debtor or creditor. If this
view is adopted, case-by-case accuracy may not even be a relevant concern
because the court will not have to focus on the particular facts or equities of the
case.
This argument is bolstered by, though not dependent upon, a further
assertion that the cramdown provision is directed primarily at affecting ex ante
creditor behavior rather than creditor behavior in bankruptcy. For example, since
cramdown is forced upon the creditor, the present value requirement likely does
not reflect a desire to affect the behavior of a creditor in bankruptcy. However,
the cramdown rate will "wash backwards" and be reflected in the negotiated
reorganization. Since the Code directly controls creditor behavior in a chapter 11
reorganization, one could argue that the purpose of the cramdown rate is to
affect the behavior of pre-bankruptcy creditors. Under this theory, the restated
goal of the cramdown provision is to make creditors indifferent ex ante between
the prospect of receiving the collateral under a chapter 7 liquidation and receiving the then-present value of the collateral under the cramdown interest rate. At
the point of cramdown, creditors will be exposed to a range of risk levels from

95. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 245
(GPO, 1973).
96. Id.
97. Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, to Accompany
HR 8200, HR Rep No 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 223 (1977).
98. Id at 253.
99. One might go so far as to argue that the equity concerns espoused in favor of a
case-by-case decision process are misplaced since the cramdown rate rule should not be
concerned with equity to the particular creditor in cramdown but with the behavior of the
population of creditors pre-bankruptcy.
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debtors. Ex ante, it should be very difficult for a creditor to predict whether, if
it enters bankruptcy, the debtor will be a high risk or low risk debtor at the
cramdown stage. This difficulty will increase with the time gap between the
initial loan and the date of bankruptcy. If such an assessment is assumed to be
impossible, the creditors' ex ante pricing of loans will be influenced by the average cramdown rate across all debtors. Since creditors cannot predict which
"type" of debtor they are dealing with, they will not be able to correlate the
particular cramdown rates they are likely to encounter. Even if the type of debtor
were known, the creditor would have to identify a correlation between similar
types of debtors and past cramdown rate decisions. Uncertainty as to the identity
of the presiding bankruptcy judge, and thus her particular record in determining
cramdown rates, will further complicate creditors' efforts to predict the likely
cramdown rate they would receive in a future bankruptcy.
If creditors look to the general pool of cramdown rates and are unable to
predict which will apply to them, their decisions will be driven by the average
rate. If they are risk averse, they will also consider the variance of the rate. Thus
the proposed fixed rate approach establishes a cramdown average which induces
efficient behavior and ensures virtually no variance in the pool of cramdown
rates.1° °

Inasmuch as the cramdown provision is concerned with affecting ex ante
creditor behavior, and assuming that creditors cannot accurately predict the
result of their particular future bankruptcy proceeding, courts should focus on
the net effect the pool of cramdown rates has on pre-bankruptcy creditors rather
than the effect of a particular cramdown rate on a particular creditor. A fixed
rate's total predictability would make it easier for creditors to price loans. There
would also be savings in the bankruptcy process from a fixed rate since fact
finding to determine a discretionary rate would be unnecessary.'
B. CHOOSING A FIXED RATE

If the fixed rate rule is adopted, it is important to consider the optimal fixed
rate. This rate should be chosen with an eye towards its effect on pre-bankruptcy
debtor and creditor behavior. Creditors will charge a premium for the expected

100. This approach would allow for the possibility of some rare adjustments in the
fixed cramdown rate.
101. Estimates of the average cost of bankruptcy proceedings vary widely. One study
found that for personal bankruptcies the cost of bankruptcy represented about 20 percent
of the debtor's assets. Nevine D. Baxter, Leverage, Risk of Ruin, and the Cost of Capital,
22 J Fin 395, 395-96 (1967). Another study found that for large railroad firms the cost
of bankruptcy was 1 percent of the market value of the firm. Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J Fin 337, 337 (1977). However, even at 1 percent for large
firms, the costs of bankruptcy are quite large. Further, as Warner has noted, these
estimates are only for the direct costs of bankruptcy and do not include indirect costs like
lost sales, lost profits, and the possible inability of the firm to obtain credit or to issue
securities except under especially onerous terms (see discussion of new loan approach in
Section I above). Id at 340-41.
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risk and cost of default or bankruptcy. Setting aside other costs of bankruptcy
and under-security, any cramdown rate below the contract rate should increase
the premium charged in proportion with the perceived risk of bankruptcy.
Similarly, the premium would be reduced by any cramdown rate above the
contract rate. The effect of a cramdown rate which is significantly below or
above the average contract rate will be to raise or lower the pre-bankruptcy rate
charged. Since such a premium would be proportional to the perceived risk of
bankruptcy, this effect would be magnified for high risk debtors.
The costs of bankruptcy and of inefficient investment are both a net loss for
the market. The difficulty here is balancing these two costs. If a cramdown rate
is set too low, it will result in higher interest rates, which will stifle efficient
projects and send more debtors into bankruptcy. Creditors will seek a high prebankruptcy premium in an effort to "siphon" out bankruptcy costs, and perhaps
some security interest, in advance of bankruptcy. In a sense, the creditor is preempting the bankruptcy process and may ironically drive a borderline debtor into
bankruptcy. This suggests setting a high cramdown rate to prevent such preemptive behavior by guaranteeing lower bankruptcy losses to creditors. However, if
cramdown rates are set too high, many more reorganizations will fail and end in
bankruptcy, thus thwarting the primary goal of chapter 11. In fact, a high fixed
cramdown rate may even preempt an attempt at reorganization by triggering the
feasibility requirement of the Code.' Under this section, a plan cannot be
confirmed if it is likely to be followed by a liquidation or the need for further
financial reorganization. °3 In the most general terms, the foregoing suggests
that a fixed rate approximating the average secured debt contract rate would
induce the most efficient behavior in pre-bankruptcy creditors.
The cramdown rate also affects the decision to enter into bankruptcy. The
higher the rate, the greater the incentive for creditors to apply for involuntary
bankruptcy since the threat reorganization is only significant if the cramdown
rate is low. Conversely, the lower the cramdown rate, the greater the incentive
for debtors to seek chapter 11 reorganization relief. Bankruptcy proceedings are,
in and of themselves, a net cost to the market. To the extent that they can be
avoided by pre-bankruptcy workouts, 1 such behavior should therefore be
encouraged. In In re Colonial Ford,the court noted that several sections of the
Code, including S 305(a)(1), reflect this policy favoring workouts.' Since the
hurdles to creditors seeking involuntary bankruptcy are far higher than to
debtors seeking chapter 11 protection, the effect the cramdown rate has upon
debtors is more important. This suggests that the cramdown rate should be
adjusted slightly upward to remove any additional incentive for debtors to enter
bankruptcy and take advantage of the low cramdown rate. While the creditor
effect does not vanish, it is at least somewhat overshadowed by the debtor effect.
102. 11 USC S 1129(a)(10).
103. Id.

104. Workouts are defined as "private, negotiated adjustments of creditor-company relations." In re Colonial Ford, 24 Bankr 1014, 1015 (Bankr D Utah 1982).

105. Id.
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This result is bolstered by the possibility of a lengthy cramdown proceeding,
0 6
which has a greater negative effect upon the creditor.
The preceding discussion suggests that a fixed rate somewhat above either a
market average contract rate or the particular contract rate would be an optimal
balance of the dual goals of inducing efficient investment and minimizing
bankruptcy costs. However, such a fixed rate would itself be susceptible to
interest rate risk. Over time, the market average contract rate can change radically based on changes in the credit market and the real interest rate. Thus a
truly fixed rate "magical number" would likely become stale fairly quickly. For
example, the real interest rate moved in an 11.58 percent range between -3.44
percent and 8.14 percent in the decade between 1974 and 1984."°7 If we presume that creditors can price the risk of changes in the interest rate ex ante, then
such a fixed rate may be an effective rule."°8 This presumption is reasonable,
since just as creditors are in the business of assessing the creditor-worthiness and
bankruptcy risk of debtors, they are also in the business of pricing such risk in
the context of changing market interest rates. Thus a fixed rate which makes the
cramdown rate equal to the contract rate plus some small premium should
provide an effective and predictable rule.
However, one might argue that while the creditor did contract to accept
interest rate risk for the term of the contract, she did not contract to accept it for
the potentially longer term of payment in a reorganization plan or under the
changed circumstances of the reorganization. This argument suggests a fixed rate
with a variable portion to remove the interest rate risk. Such a rate would be
similar to the formula approach taken by some courts,"0 9 with a foundation of
some standard rate (prime, treasury, etc.) and some additional factor. However,
unlike the formula approach, under a fixed approach the additional factor would
be a fixed premium or discount, rather than a discretionary premium determined
by the judge or by common judicial practice, as is the case for the 2 percent
standard. Thus, while less predictable than a true fixed rate, an interest-sensitive
fixed rate would only move with market interest rates. Since creditors are able to
price variable rate loans, presumably they can also price the risk of having a
variable rate loan based on a standard market interest rate." 0
Some courts have in effect adopted such an interest-sensitive fixed rate by

106. In his analysis of the effect of delay on criminal and civil cases, William Landes
found that such delay reduces the prosecutor/plaintiff's minimum sentence/settlement offer
while it has a dual and offsetting effect upon the defendant. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61, 102 (1971).
107. John Rutledge, Don't Expect a Lasting Recovery after the Recession, US News &
World Rep 49 (Apr 22, 1991).
108. One advantage of using the particular contract interest rate is that since variable
rate contracts effectively self-correct for changes in interest rates, the interest rate risk is
eliminated for this population of contracts.
109. See text accompanying notes 44-56.
110. Note that under the formula approach, the creditor is faced with the challenge of
pricing the discretionary risk factor that the court assigns.
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always choosing 2 percent for their risk factor."' However, while an interestsensitive fixed rate is certainly more predictable than a purely discretionary rate,
a true fixed rate based on the particular contract rate is more perfectly predictable. Such a rate leaves the task of pricing the risks and costs of cramdown
to the parties who are most concerned with such pricing, and best suited to do
SO.
C. POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF A FIXED CRAMDOWN RATE

While there is a strong argument for the adoption of a fixed rate rule, there
are certainly pitfalls to this approach. Such a rule removes the cramdown rate as
an informal policy tool in the hands of the judiciary. There are several reasons
why a judge may reasonably seek an informal wealth transfer between parties
through the cramdown rate. The judge may find that the net interests of society
in achieving, or blocking, a reorganization override the interests of a party.
However, the judge may be able to meet this goal through her fairly wide general
discretion to approve or reject reorganization plans. The judge may also Pse the
cramdown rate to address inequities between the parties. Such inequities might
stem from market inefficiencies"' or behavior of the parties which violates the
intent of the law but does not trigger a legal remedy.
A fixed rate rule also clearly rests on the presumption that parties are fairly
effective at pricing such a rate ex ante. If the parties are unable to adjust their
negotiations and agreements ex ante, we cannot presume that the fixed rate is
either equitable or efficient.
Another potential problem with a fixed rate rule is the effect it may have on
the credit markets as they adjust to a systematic change in the "rules of the
game." Presumably, any fixed cramdown rate which is lower than the average
historical cramdown rate, should cause interest rates on relevant debt or required
collateral levels to rise, leading to a tightening of credit as marginal debtors are
squeezed out. Similarly, a fixed cramdown rate which is higher than the average
historical rate should cause a decrease in interest rates or collateral demanded
and a corresponding loosening of credit. At the same time, a higher cramdown
rate will likely reduce the success rate for reorganizations, just as a lower rate
will likely increase the success rate.
While a radical difference between a fixed rate and the historical rate might
have some effect on the credit markets, it is important to note that the effect of
any cramdown rate rule will be discounted by the likelihood of cramdown. Since
presumably only a tiny fraction of all credit agreements result in a cramdown
upon the creditor, the shift to a new fixed cramdown rate should only have a
marginal affect upon pre-bankruptcy credit agreements. For example, if we posit
a fixed rate rule with a 4 percent deviation from the historical cramdown rate,
and we presume that 1 percent of all credit agreements result in a cramdown, the
111. See text accompanying notes 69-70.
112. Such inefficiencies might include the ability of some creditors to extract oligopoly

or monopoly rates directly or indirectly from debtors. See text accompanying note 68.
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establishment of this fixed rate rule should create a 0.04 percent shift in credit
market rates.
There is also a question of equity during the transition to a fixed
rate rule for those parties who have already contracted under the old discretionary regime. In effect, one party or the other will suffer a loss, depending upon
whether the fixed rate is above or below the historical cramdown rate. However,
such effects can be significantly lessened by creating a grandfather clause or
similar delay structure. This will allow the new cramdown rate to only apply to
those contracts made after its adoption.
Thus, if one goal of any legislative or judicial fixed rate is to avoid a systemic effect upon the credit markets, we are constrained to choosing a fixed rate at
or about the average historical cramdown rate. This does not remove the option
of choosing an interest rate-sensitive cramdown rate. Over time, this rate may
shift away from the initial rate, but it will only simulate changes in the credit
markets since it will mirror the effect of the underlying real shift in interest rates.
Given the indirect and imperfect transitive effects of the cramdown rate upon
ex ante creditor and debtor decisionmaking, as well as the secondary costs of an
unstable credit market, there is a strong argument against using the cramdown
rate as a policy tool to manipulate credit markets and, for instance, the flow of
credit to high risk debtors.
IV. Conclusion
The choice of a cramdown regime should be driven by the goals of eliminating costs in the bankruptcy process and harnessing the efficiency of the market
and its ability to price risk. This can be done by making the costs and risks of
cramdown as predictable, and thus "priceable" as possible. In turn this suggests
that some form of uniform fixed cramdown rate may be not only feasible but
also preferable. An interest rate-sensitive rate based on some standard interest
rate measure, and a fixed premium chosen to create a net cramdown rate equal
to the recent historical average cramdown rate, would provide the best basis for
a shift to a fixed rate regime.113 However, even more critical than the choice of
the particular fixed rate is the importance of establishing some highly predictable
and uniform cramdown rate regime from which creditors and debtors can most
effectively price ex ante the costs and risks of bankruptcy. This approach is
supported by the efforts of some circuits, through the formula approach, to develop uniform fixed rate regimes. However, it is unlikely that a uniform rule will
emerge across all circuits. The creation of such a rule is better left to Congress.

113. While I will not undertake a calculation of the recent historical average cramdown
rate, in those jurisdictions where the formula approach has been embraced, prime plus 2
percent is likely a good approximation of the average.

